co-authored with Stephen Mihm (journalist and economic historian)
By the way, Rubini is also seen co-writing books on Maro and the political cycle.
and buyouts in developing countries, you can feel it in his personality.
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About good.
* Interesting. (especially if you like Rubini's style, to me, for example, No).
* Rubini is almost unbiased. As in every good elementary ektheory course, the subject of the conversation is visible from several sides. If, after the initial course you did not understand, that there are no linear connections, то вам, finally, nothing will help, but it's never too late to start over.
* In detail. If you do not know where the legs of events grow from 2008 years and how everything developed, будет полезно.
* Considerate the need for reform and how to approach it. If you are also not interested in politics as I am, then the course will be useful to you in some moments and aspects of the possibility of implementing one or another approach to reforming the IMF, for example. Понимания того, how the world works it will not add, но в дискуссиях будете выглядеть солиднее после прочтения Books.
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About bad.
* The book is about nothing. Я плохо знаком с творчеством Рубини, maybe he's a good economist, but something worthwhile did not come across to me. Many see a bubble, just some say “will carry”, others say “No”. The last time the second was more fortunate. At least interesting thoughts, расчетов, I did not hear any suggestions from Rubini and did not find them in the book. I also warned, that there will be no growth in rates and the growth rate will be lower, arguing more likely with a chuyka, than logic. It doesn't make me an economist.) Так и тут. The book is built on words to a greater extent, than ideas. If you want to find an interesting macro there, then he is not there.
* IN “causes of the crisis” there are many special, but there is also a basic contradiction that does not fit in the heads of those far from economic theories: Yes, the state created the wrong incentives (too many states), And, Yes, the state did not keep track of the financial sector and income stratification (too little state). Rubini has a big bias to the side “too little state”, хотя и “he does not deny wrong incentives”.
* A lot of snotty proposals about bad financiers and evil Goldman and the City.
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Summary.
1. About Keynes, Sumpetere and Minsk. Excessive debt, irrationality or crisis – is not black Swan, and white. Ie. everything was clear, everything could be predicted. Where do financial crises come from?. Financial crises have been and will always be. Many historical examples.
2. The problem is not with some evil mortgage papers.. It can almost be summed up under my thesis that, that if a financial panic did not happen, a recession would still be unavoidable, especially for developing countries due to overheating. In Ukraine (repeatedly mentioned in the book) enough bad loans have been made and so. Basically, 2007-2008 would have happened anyway, mortgage boom – this is a consequence, not the cause of the crisis.
3. Описывается история финансовых инноваций и секьюритизации. Basically, the latter consists of two parts: create and distribute. The problem is not how the risks were allocated (although this too), and in that, that it was originally based on bad loans. The weapon is not to blame, people are to blame.
4. Reflections on Necessary Reforms. Rating agencies, derivatives on the organized market, change in the principle of compensation, reform of international financial institutions, the role of the dollar, increasing the prestige of working as a regulator, avoidance of regulatory arbitration, etc..
5. A look at what's happening from the perspective of spring 2010 of the year. “Growth will slow down in the second half of the year.” Down with Russia from BRIC, Индонезию, South Korea to BRIC. Watch out for bubbles and dollar carry trade. U-shaped recession. Deflation first (Risks), then inflation (as the main risk to stability, after low growth rates, apparently). Horror, it is not now, horror – this is if the state cannot cope with the load and de-globalization begins.
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Generally, someone will like, кому-то нет. IN “the return of the great depression” Krugman is more macro, for example, and much less speculation about normative economics (What do we have to do). My personal conclusion – Rubini is more interesting as a person, what it seems, but in fact, it was not possible to get to his thoughts.