This time is different: review
I see, that the book is good and needs to be read. In fact, there is not much text there., conclusions too. Or rather, cautious conclusions. Let's put it this way., this is only the first step in information processing. Her, Information, still very, very little. There is nothing fundamentally new in nkiga. If you are a little interested in history, then the ideas are known and understood, but they are systematized in the book. There are no stories in the book. Ie. this is not a semi-fiction book about crashes and upheavals. It starts with a discussion of the methodology and moves on in style: we have collected the data – here's a table / graph – well, in general, everything is visible on it. The book is a little worse than expectations, but good at correcting ideas and guesses, actual confirmation or refutation of facts.
A short set of ideas:
1) Foreign debt defaults have always been paid, many times. Some countries are more prone to default, but it's not obvious. For example, Spain at one time was a record holder, but, seem to be, it was only an episode. Also data on external defaults, as well as internal (+ inflation, real estate, etc.) extremely low quality and very few of them (the authors are surprised, how can such a huge industry as the debt market exist without knowing its own history).
2) Defaults happen with completely different debt / GDP ratios (and others). Domestic debt, and private sector debt, along with inflation and financial / banking crises, form a single 'default' whole" to establish causal relationships in which it is extremely difficult. By simplifying: if it is not clear why this or that default occurred – look at the circumstances. Domestic debt is defaulted as easily as domestic debt. Which default is worse (internal or external) unclear, how the system reacts depending on the circumstances.
3) The printing press has always existed, just before he acted technologically more complicated – by reducing the share of precious metals in coins. Ie. inflationary and devaluation shocks have always been.
4) Financial and banking crises have a long history. A financial crisis is often followed by a debt crisis due to a buyout / bailout of the financial system (bailout). Bailout – the phenomenon is not new at all. And moral hazard is not a new phenomenon any more.
