Для начала просто quote из Розенберга: Real final sales, despite all the government’s efforts, have only managed to recover at a 1½% annual rate since the recession supposedly ended last summer. In a typical post-recession bounceback, the rebound is closer to 3½% and with far less intervention out of the Fed, Treasury, White House and Congress.
Мысль сводится к тому, that the purchases of residents without taking into account the dynamics of reserves are not growing as. It's even easier to follow – weak consumer behaves inappropriately than consumers behave during a cyclical recession. And that means, that the system will react very badly to the withdrawal of incentives, definitely worse than the market expects.
Let's look at it for ourselves schedule Real Final Sales of Domestic Products.
Unlike Dave, I took a longer period and averaged over two periods. (originally on the chart – annualized quarterly data). Really, looks weak?
But the solution to the riddle seems to lie in another., namely, to slow the pace of recovery (when taking into account the cool base effect). All in all, you don't need to see the dynamics of Real Final Sales of Domestic Products, and somehow correlate it with the dynamics of GDP.
It is suggested to simply subtract one growth rate from another., and also average by 2 Quarters.
Not so, to be very coherent methodologically, but I don't notice the space for statistical instrumental error for our task..
Actually the difference in growth rates.
So here, if we are comparing the current recession with the post-war ones., initially knowing, that they have a different nature, then the current backlog in domestic sales should not scare us in the same historical context..
In other words, no additional light in the realm of darkness we get using the dynamics of RFSoDP.
The focus is now some slowdown in momentum and old friends. – capacity utilization and inflation, plus demand for credit + real estate + income without transfers.
